Juncker Investment Plan Investigation Report - 容克投資計劃調查報告
Director 指揮 ： KEITH YUNXI ZHU 朱耘希 | AUTUMN SHUANG QIU 秋爽
Supervisor 監視 ： Oliver Niles White 懷特 尼爾斯 奧利弗
Authors 作者 ： Jinwei Chen, Oliver Dalmi, Xiaobei Chen, Martia Karim, Fabio Pavoncello, Ajith Kurian, Ma Ying Chi, Junkai Fang, Max Soederlind, Rurik Högberg, Runzhou Chen, Lili Price, Ayman El Mezgueldi, Lorenzo Bianco
BACKGROUND BRIEF
背景簡介
The Bank of China International was informed about an opportunity to attract European capitals to China via the Juncker Investment Plan. However, with information being ambiguous, and one of the investing entities being Samoa-incorporated, it was for BOCI to identify the legitimacy and reliability of this very project. As a long-term partner of BOCI, THE KEITH & EVEN GROUP saw the potential of this investment opportunity, and decided to take the opportunity to conduct a series of investigation on the Juncker Investment Plan, as a pre-assessment for the cooperation between TKEG China and BOCI on this particular investment project.
中銀國際聯絡人近期被告知一項一個從歐洲向中國引資的容克投資計劃。然而，信息模糊，及其中一個投資實體為薩摩亞建立。中銀國際則需要確認此計畫的可靠性及真實性。 作為中銀國際的長期合作夥伴，奕資有限公司看到了此計畫的潛力，且決定對容克投資計畫展開一系列的調查，作為對奕資及中銀國際在此計畫上的合作而做的事先調查。
1
Junker Investment Plan In Brief
容克投資計畫簡介
The Juncker Plan, formally known as the EU Infrastructure Investment Plan, is a large-scale infrastructure investment program created in 2014 by the European Union under Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission and is a joint undertaking by the European Commission and the European Investment Bank. The primary financial component of the Juncker Plan is the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI).
容克計劃，全名歐盟基礎設施投資計劃，是歐盟委員會主席讓-克洛德·容克（Jean-Claude Juncker）領導下的歐盟於2014年制定的一項大型基礎設施投資計劃，是歐盟委員會和歐洲投資銀行合作的聯合項目。容克計劃的主要財務組成部分是歐洲戰略投資基金 (EFSI)。
The Juncker Plan operates by giving loans to projects seeking to build infrastructure and generate jobs within the European Union. 9 EU member states have pledged to help cofinance projects. 75% of the available capital has been designated for infrastructure and strategic projects. These include transportation, telecommunications, energy efficiency initiatives, education infrastructure, and healthcare facilities. To quality for this category of projects, a project must require over EUR 25 million, and must apply directly to the European Investment Bank. The remaining 25% of the capital is available to SMEs and mid-caps through venture capital funds, banks, and other financial intermediaries.
容克計劃通過向尋求在歐盟內建設基礎設施和創造就業機會的項目提供貸款來運作。9個歐盟成員國已承諾幫助共同融資項目。75%的可用資金已指定用於基礎設施和戰略項目。其中包括交通、電信、能源效率舉措、教育基礎設施和醫療保健設施。為保證此類項目的質量，一個項目必須要求超過 2500 萬歐元，並且必須直接向歐洲投資銀行申請。其餘 25% 的資本可通過風險投資基金、銀行和其他金融中介機構提供給中小企業和中型企業。
While originally setting out to facilitate EUR 315 billion in investment by the end of 2018, it hit this goal in mid 2018 [1], and reacing over EUR 344 billion by the end of 2018. With this success, a new goal was set of EUR 500 billion with the goal of the end of 2020 [2].
雖然最初計劃到 2018 年底達到 3150 億歐元的投資，但它在 2018年中期就實現了這一目標 [1]，到2018年底達到了超過3440億歐元。隨著這一成功，歐洲投資銀行設定了一個新的5000億歐元目標，時間是 2020 年底 [2]。
Across its various investments, the fund is projected to have increased the GDP of the EU by 1.8% and create over 1.7 million new jobs within the EU by 2022. Of the funds invested, over 70% have been sourced from private resources. With participants in all 28 EU countries, over 1200 projects have been approved for financing, and over 1 million startups and small businesses have recieved access to otherwise unavailable financing [3].
通過各種渠道的投資，該基金預計到2022年將使歐盟的GDP增加1.8%，並在歐盟內創造超過170萬個新工作崗位。在投資的資金中，超過70%來自私人投資。在所有28個歐盟國家的參與者中，超過1200個項目已獲批融資，超過100萬家初創企業和小企業獲得了原本無法獲得的融資 [3]。
As of 2021, the Juncker Plan has now been incorperated under the broader umbrella of the InvestEU program, however this does not change its functions, goals, or operations [2].
截至2021年，容克計劃現已納入InvestEU計劃的更廣泛的保護範圍內，但這並沒有改變其功能、目標或運營 [2]。
2
Junker Investment Plan and Chinese Government
中國政府參與容克投資計畫
On June 29, 2015, Premier Li Keqiang delivered a speech on "Join Hands to Create a New Situation in China-EU Relations" at the China-EU Business Summit in Brussels. The speech indicated that China was willing to join with the Junker Investment Plan (Europe Investment Plan, hereinafter are referred to as Junker Investment Plan) and achieve economic breakthroughs in four areas: China-EU infrastructure joint construction, China-EU equipment manufacturing, China-EU financial cooperation, and China-EU trade and investment liberalization to deepen China-EU practical cooperation[6].
2015年6月29日，國務院總理李克強在布魯塞爾中歐工商峰會發表《攜手開創中歐關係新局面》的演講。演講表明，中方願與容克投資計畫（歐洲投資計畫）對接，並從中歐基礎設施共建、中歐裝備製造、中歐金融合作、貿易投資自由化四個領域實現經濟突破，深化中歐務實合作[6]。
Opportunities
机遇China-EU Infrastructure Joint Construction
中歐基礎設施共建
Infrastructure construction is the entry point for China-EU international capacity cooperation. To support the construction of European transportation and energy networks, the European Union has launched Junker investment plan with a total investment of 315 billion euros. China is able to and willing to actively participate in this investment plan, and China will support strong and reputable Chinese companies to participate in infrastructure projects such as the Pan-European transportation networks, the China-Europe Europe Sea Express, and the new Eurasian Continental Bridge[6]
基礎設施建設是中歐國際產能合作的切入點。為支援歐洲交通和能源網路等建設，歐盟推出了投資總額為3150億歐元的容克投資計畫。中方有能力也有意願積極參與這一投資計畫，並支援實力強、有信譽的中方企業參與泛歐交通網絡、中歐陸海快線、新亞歐大陸橋等基礎設施項目[6]。
China-EU Cooperation 2020 Strategic Plan (Unable to find official information)
《中歐合作2020戰略規劃》（無法查找到官方資料）China-Europe Equipment Manufacturing——Third Party Cooperation
中歐裝備製造——協力廠商合作
To carry out capacity cooperation projects in Central and Eastern Europe, Chinese companies must make full use of their advantages in equipment manufacturing and integration capabilities, and they must also purchase some equipments from European countries to provide reliable equipments for infrastructure construction and industrial development[6].
中國企業在中東歐地區開展產能合作專案，要發揮自身裝備製造和集成能力優勢，也要採購歐洲國家部分裝備，為基礎設施建設和產業發展提供可靠裝備[6]。China-EU Financial Cooperation
中歐金融合作
To meet the needs of industrial investment, the two sides must make breakthroughs in financial cooperation——China is willing to support European development by purchasing EIB Bonds, direct investment, establishing joint investment funds etc.[6] :雙方為滿足產業投資需求，要在金融合作上取得突破——中方願以購買歐洲投資銀行債券、直接投資、建立共同投資基金等多種方式參與歐洲發展[6]：China-EU Joint Investment Fund
中歐共同投資基金
Silk Road Fund and the European Investment Fund (EIF) signed the China-Europe Joint Investment Fund Co-investment Agreement in April 2018, officially establishing the China-Europe Joint Investment Fund.[7]
絲路基金與歐洲投資基金（EIF）於2018年4月簽署《中歐共同投資基金共同投資協定》，正式設立中歐共同投資基金。[7]
The EU-China Joint Investment Fund has an investment scale of 500 million Euros and an investment period of 3 years[8]. The China-EU Joint Investment Fund mainly invests in European sub-funds to indirectly invest in small and medium-sized enterprises that promote China-Europe cooperation and are promising, and it focuses on the fields of transportation, energy conservation, information communication, industrial production capacity, life and health, etc., which have a broad space for cooperation in industries between China and Europe.
中歐共同投資基金投資規模5億歐元，投資期3年[8]。中歐共同投資基金主要通過投資歐洲的子基金，間接投向促進中歐合作、商業前景較好的中小企業，重點關注交通、節能、資訊通信、工業產能和生命健康等在中歐之間具有廣闊合作空間的行業。
During the 20th China-EU Leaders’ Summit, Silk Road Fund and European Investment Fund signed the Memorandum of Understanding on the Implementation of the First China-EU Joint Investment Fund and Continued Deepening of Cooperation, and announced the launch of the first China-Europe Joint Investment Fund "Kay Hui M&A Fund Phase II" (20th summit). The fund raised 600 million euros (approximately US$690 million) in the first phase of financing, supported by the European Strategic Investment Fund under the "Junker Plan", China Development Bank, China Silk Road Fund, etc., with the goal of financing 1.2 billion euros for medium-sized companies[9].
在第二十次中國歐盟領導人會晤期間，絲路基金與歐洲投資基金簽署《關於中歐共同投資基金首單專案落地與繼續深化合作的諒解備忘錄》，宣佈啟動第一支中歐共同投資基金“凱輝並購基金二期”（20th summit）。該基金首期融資募集到6億歐元（約合6.9億美元），由“容克計畫”下的歐洲戰略投資基金和中國國家開發銀行、中國絲路基金等共同支援，目標是為中型企業融資12億歐元[9]。China Purchases European Investment Bank Bonds (Unable to find official information)
中方購買歐洲投資銀行債券（無法查找到官方資料）Improve the RQFII system
健全RQFII制度
SAFE has announced the removal of investment limit for Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII) and RMB Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (RQFII), as well as restrictions on RQFII pilot countries and regions.[10]
國家外匯管理局已宣佈取消合格境外機構投資者（QFII）和人民幣合格境外機構投資者（RQFII）投資額度限制，也取消了RQFII試點國家和地區限制。[10]
At the same time, the Measures for the Administration of Domestic Securities Investment by QFII and the Pilot Measures for the Domestic Securities Investment of RQFII have been revised and integrated to form the Measures for the Administration of Domestic Securities and Futures Investment for QFII and RQFII (hereinafter referred to as the “Administrative Measures”) and Regarding the Implementation of the Measures for the Administration of Domestic Securities and Futures Investment for QFII and RQFII Regulations on relevant issues.[10]
同時，對《合格境外機構投資者境內證券投資管理辦法》、《人民幣合格境外機構投資者境內證券投資試點辦法》進行了修訂整合，形成了《合格境外機構投資者及人民幣合格境外機構投資者境內證券期貨投資管理辦法》（以下簡稱《管理辦法》）和《關於實施〈合格境外機構投資者及人民幣合格境外機構投資者境內證券期貨投資管理辦法〉有關問題的規》（以下簡稱《實施規定》）。[10]
Improve Trade Liberalization
提升贸易自由化水平
China hopes that EU will take advantage of the opportunity of export control reform to adjust and broaden export restrictions on dual-use products to China, and strengthen cooperation and experience exchange in high-tech fields such as space technology and manned spaceflight. [6]
中方希望歐方利用出口管制改革契機，調整放寬軍民兩用等產品對華出口限制，加強空間技術、載人航太等高科技領域的合作與經驗交流。[6]
To upgrade the level of trade and investment liberalization, the two sides have completed the China-EU Investment Agreement negotiations as scheduled on December 30, 2020 but both sides haven't signed the agreement.[11]
為提升貿易投資自由化水準，雙方已於2020年12月30日如期完成中歐投資協定談判，但尚未簽署協定。[11]
Risks
风险The Epidemic Has Not Yet Stabilized
新冠肺炎疫情尚未穩定
As the epicenter of the COVID-19 outbreak, the epidemic has led to a significant decline in external demand in Europe. At the same time, it is accompanied by the uncertainty of the secondary epidemic and the vaccine mass production application, making the European economic recovery weaker than expected.
作為新冠肺炎疫情的重災區，新冠疫情已經導致歐洲外部需求銳減顯著，並同時伴有二次疫情和疫苗量產應用的不確定性，使得歐洲經濟復甦弱於預期。Xinjiang Issue
新疆問題
There are still conflicts between China and Europe on the human rights issue in Xinjiang. Beijing implemented punitive measures to prevent people on the sanctions list from traveling to China or doing business with Chinese companies in March 2021 in response to Western sanctions against Chinese officials on the Xinjiang issue. However, the EU stated that China’s sanctions are not based on international law, and the EU’s measures are aimed at violations of human rights stipulated in the UN treaty.
中方與歐方在新疆人權問題上尚存衝突。北京在2021年3月實施阻止制裁名單上的人員到中國旅行或與中國公司做生意的懲罰性措施，以回應西方針對新疆問題對中國官員的制裁。但歐盟表示，中國的制裁並不是基於國際法，而歐盟的措施是針對聯合國條約中規定的侵犯人權的行為。Unstable European Politics
歐洲政局尚未穩定
The fragmented situation of European Parliament will continue for the entire five-year term. It means that the European Parliament’s process of a series of important legislative affairs will be more complicated, such as free trade agreements, foreign policy, and EU budget issues, and may aggravate Europe political uncertainty.
歐洲議會的碎片化局面將持續整個五年任期，這意味著歐洲議會在一系列重要立法事務上的進程將更為複雜，例如自由貿易協定、外交政策以及歐盟預算等問題，並且有可能加劇歐洲政治的不確定性。
Junker Investment Plan Implement (China Participates) List
容克投資計畫（中方參與）實施清單
Summary: In the Junker Investment Plan, China has been actively involved in the joint construction of infrastructure, financial cooperation and the promotion of trade liberalization. However, due to time constraints, it may not be possible to conduct in-depth investigation. None of the official filing materials have been inquired in the fields of equipment manufacturing investment and China's investment in European Investment Bank bonds. The China-EU Investment Agreement was negotiated on December 30, 2020, but the two parties have not yet signed the agreement.
小結：經調查，在容克投資計畫中，中方在基礎設施共建、金融合作及提昇貿易自由化水平都有相當積極的參與度，但也許由於時間緊迫無法進入深度調查，本調查小組在中歐裝備製造投資、中方對歐洲投資銀行債券投資等領域均未查詢到任何官方備案資料。中歐投資協定與2020年12月30日談判完成，但至雙方至今未簽署協議。
3
Offshore Company Regulations in Europe[13]
歐洲離岸公司相關法規[13]
Nowadays, the European Union is a full-scale player of the offshore business. Such countries as Great Britain, Switzerland, Cyprus and Luxembourg are the major offshore centers of the EU, allocating the major share of the overall offshore capital. However, the EU provides a collective policy against the offshore zones and shadow economy connected with them.
如今，歐盟是離岸業務的全面參與者。英國、瑞士、塞浦路斯和盧森堡等國是歐盟的主要離岸中心，佔整體離岸資本的主要份額。與此同時，歐盟針對離岸區域和與之相關的影子經濟提供了集體政策。
The legislative measures are conducted very actively and the m[7]ajority of them are efficient. These measures include the united consolidates corporate tax base for companies and creation of the EU tax havens list. The governments of the European countries have to be sure that their corporate tax systems are transparent, fair and do not provoke unlawful companies and transactions from other regions.
歐盟的立法措施非常積極，且大多數是有效的。這些措施包括聯合鞏固公司的公司稅基和創建歐盟避稅天堂名單。歐洲國家的政府必須確保他們的公司稅系統透明、公平，不會引起其他地區的非法公司和交易。
Anti tax avoidance directive[14]
反避稅指令[14]
On 28 January 2016 the Commission presented its proposal for an Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive as part of the Anti Tax Avoidance Package. The Package contains concrete measures to prevent aggressive tax planning, boost tax transparency and crete a level playing field for all businesses in the EU.
2016年1月28日，歐盟委員會提交了其關於反避稅指令的提案，作為反避稅計劃的一部分。該計劃包含防止激進稅收籌劃、提高稅收透明度並為歐盟所有企業創造公平競爭環境的具體措施。
It creates a minimum level of protection against corporate tax avoidance throughout the EU, while ensuring a fairer and more stable environment for businesses. The general trend nowadays is that the share of offshore financial assets flowing from the developed regions is decreasing and yielding to the expansion of the deve oping regions, which h [8]as growth scale of about 2% annually. This is happening mainly due to the adoption of regulative measures aimed at fighting tax evasion and money laundering in the EU as attempts to bring money back from offshores. (Full council directives attached in appendix)
它為整個歐盟的企業避稅提供了最低水平的保護，同時確保為企業提供更公平、更穩定的環境。目前的總體趨勢是，來自發達地區的離岸金融資產份額正在下降，並受發展中地區的擴張影響，每年以2%左右的規模增長。發生這種情況的主要原因是歐盟採取了試圖將資金從離岸公司帶回規章制度。Information of Offshore Jurisdictions and “Tax Heaven” in EU[15]
灣歐盟離岸司法管轄區及“稅收天堂”信息[15]
It is believed that the lists published by the OECD and the International Monetary Fund, which use different criteria for determining tax havens, are highly politicized. At the same time, the index of financial secrecy of tax law and the list of "Oxfam" from the worst corporate tax havens are more useful. Several large countries, in particular the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Singapore and Ireland, have reported that they are serving as global channels for transferring money to offshore financial centers, according to the study. Together, these five channels convey 47% of corporate offshore investment from tax havens.
使用不同的標準，經合組織和國際貨幣基金組織公佈的避稅港的名單被認為高度政治化。相反，稅法財務保密指數和來自最差企業避稅天堂的“樂施會”名單更有用。研究顯示，幾個大國，特別是荷蘭、英國、瑞士、新加坡和愛爾蘭，已報告稱它們正在充當向離岸金融中心轉移資金的全球渠道。這五個渠道總共從避稅天堂傳輸了 47% 的企業離岸投資。
Each jurisdiction specializes in geographic and industrial sectors. For example, the Netherlands prefer holding companies, while Luxemburg promotes administrative services. Hong Kong's geographic specialization is combined with the British Virgin Islands and Taiwan. These calculations refute the myth of tax haven as exotic distant islands, which are difficult, if not impossible, to regulate. Many offshore financial centers are highly developed countries with a strong regulatory environment.
每個司法管轄區都專門研究地理和工業部門。例如，荷蘭更喜歡控股公司，而盧森堡則提倡行政服務。香港的地理專業化與英屬維爾京群島和台灣相結合。這些計算駁斥了避稅天堂是異國情調的遙遠島嶼的神話，這些島嶼即使不是不可能，也很難監管。許多離岸金融中心都是高度發達的國家監管環境。EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions[16]
歐盟非合作管轄區名單[16]
The EU is working to improve international tax governance. Given the global nature of unfair tax competition, this also means addressing external challenges to EU countries' tax bases.
歐盟正在努力改善國際稅收治理。鑑於不公平稅收的全球性質競爭，這也意味著應對歐盟國家稅基的外部挑戰 。
The list adopted by the Council on 22 February 2021 is composed of:
理事會於 2021 年 2 月 22 日通過的名單包括：
American Samoa
美國薩摩亞Anguilla
安圭拉Dominica
多摩西亞(new)Fiji
新斐濟島Guam
關島Palau
帕勞
Panama
巴拿馬Samoa
薩摩亞Trinidad and Tobago
特里尼亞US Virgin Islands
維爾京群島Vanuatu
瓦努阿圖Seychelles
塞舌爾
The list becomes official upon publication in the Official Journal, see Appendix.
該名單在官方期刊上發表後成為正式名單，請參閱附錄。
Data References
數據參考
European Commission. (2018, July 18). Juncker Plan exceeds original €315 billion investment target - EU monitor. EU Monitor. https://www.eumonitor.eu/9353000/1/j9vvik7m1c3gyxp/vkq5hhtcdtyq?ctx=vjp5ckt6m4rn
European Commission. (2019a, June 20). Juncker Plan reaches almost €410 billion in triggered investment across the EU. European Commission - European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_3330
European Commission. (2019b, August 22). Juncker Plan has made major impact on EU jobs and growth. European Commission - European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_6119
European Investment Bank. (2020, June 20). RENTEL OFFSHORE WIND. EIB. https://www.eib.org/en/projects/pipelines/all/20150619
Otary. (n.d.). Rentel. Retrieved June 6, 2021, from https://www.otary.be/en/projects/rentel
李克強訪歐：願參與3150億歐元歐洲投資計畫 望放寬軍民兩用品出口. (2015). Retrieved 6 June 2021, from https://www.observersnews.com/economy/2015_06_30_325049_s.shtml
第二十次中國歐盟領導人會晤聯合聲明(全文）. (2018). Retrieved 6 June 2021, from https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cebe/chn/zozyzcwj/celdr/t1578374.htm
中歐共同投資基金：深化互利合作 促進資金融通_光明網. (2019). Retrieved 6 June 2021, from https://news.gmw.cn/2019-04/25/content_32776451.htm
第一支中歐共同投資基金首期募資6億歐元-新華網. (2018). Retrieved 6 June 2021, from http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2018-08/07/c_1123237088.htm
關於《合格境外機構投資者及人民幣合格境外機構投資者境內證券期貨投資管理辦法（徵求意見稿）》及其配套規則的說明Retrieved 6 June 2021, from http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/zjhpublic/zjh/201901/P020190131645144511526.pdf
歐盟:中歐投資協定將給歐企赴華投資帶來更多確定性_滾動新聞_中國政府網. (2018). Retrieved 6 June 2021, from http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2021-03/13/content_5592743.htm
鐵路“十三五”計畫Retrieved 6 June 2021, from http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/zjhpublic/zjh/201901/P020190131645144511526.pdf
Buijze, R., June 14, 2016. The Categorisation of Tax Jurisdictions in Comparative Tax Law Research. Erasmus Law Review,.
Eur-lex.europa.eu. August 5, 2021. COUNCIL DIRECTIVE amending Directive (EU) 2016/1164 as regards hybrid mismatches with third countries.
Yu, S., January 20, 2021. TAXATION AND OFFSHORE HEAVENS IN EU COUNTRIES. [online] Dspace.wunu.edu.ua.
Eur-lex.europa.eu. 2021. Council conclusions on the revised EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes.
Appendix
附錄
COUNCIL DIRECTIVE amending Directive (EU) 2016:1164 as regards hybrid mismatches with third countries.pdf
Council conclusions on the revised EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes.pdf
4
Flaws in Junker Investment Plan
容克投資計劃缺陷
Problematic Geographical Concentration
項目地理分佈存疑
EFSI’s investments mainly favor the more advanced economies in Western Europe, to the detriment of Central and Eastern Europe. Hence, this concentration would run counter to the objective of cohesion between European regions.
歐洲戰略投資基金的投資主要有利於西歐較發達的經濟體，但對中歐和東歐不利。因此，這樣的分佈與歐洲地區之間的凝聚力目標背道而馳。
There are two investment windows in EFSI - The Infrastructure and Innovation Window(IIW) and the Small and Medium Enterprises Window(SMEW). As at 30 June 2018, financing under the IIW was concentrated (47 %) in three Member States, thus exceeding the IIW geographical concentration limit of 45 % in any three Member States as set in EFSI’s Strategic Orientation. There are no concentration limits set for the SMEW, but the same three Member States accounted for 30 % of the financing. These three countries are France (18 % or €6.2 billion), Italy (17 % or €6 billion) and Spain (12 % or €4.3 billion). [1]
歐洲戰略投資基金有兩個投資窗口——基礎設施與創新類項目（IIW）和中小企業類項目（SMEW）。截至 2018 年 6 月 30 日，基礎設施與創新類項目下的融資集中（47%）在三個成員國，因此超過了歐洲戰略投資基金戰略方向中設定的任何三個成員國 45% 的 基礎設施與創新類項目地域集中度限制。 中小企業類項目沒有設置集中度限制，但相同的三個成員國占融資的 30%。這三個國家是法國（18% 或 62 億歐元）、義大利（17% 或 60 億歐元）和西班牙（12% 或 43 億歐元）。[1]
The latest research shows that the geographical concentration of EFSI IIW in any three states continued to reach the maximum threshold established by the Steering Board and by the end of April 2019 it slightly exceeded 45 percent percent of financed operations. France, Italy and Spain rank highest in terms of guarantees for signed projects, followed by Germany, Greece and Poland.
最新研究表明，歐洲戰略投資基金的基礎設施與創新類項目在任何三個州的地理集中度達到指導委員會設定的最大閾值，到2019年4月底，它略超過融資業務的45%。法國、義大利和西班牙在簽約項目的擔保方面排名最高，其次是德國、希臘和波蘭。
Graph 1. Geographical distribution of EFSI IIW guarantees signed, April 2019(million EUR)[1]
圖 1. 2019 年 4 月簽署的歐洲戰略投資基金的基礎設施與創新類項目擔保地理分佈(百萬歐元)[1]
The Juncker Plan and the Promotion of PPP
容克計劃與政府和社會資本合作方式的推廣
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are contracts where a private company pays for, builds and sometimes runs an infrastructure project or service that is traditionally delivered by the public sector, such as schools, roads, railways and hospitals.
政府和社會資本合作 (PPP) 是私營公司支付、建造，並有時運行傳統上由公共部門（例如學校、公路、鐵路和醫院）提供的基礎設施項目或服務的合作方式。
But the claims around the benefits of private financing instruments such as PPPs have broken apart. PPPs are increasingly facing a public backlash as their effects become clearer over time, and some European countries have moved away from the model. In March 2018, the European Court of Auditors published a special report exposing the failure of PPPs and slamming EU’s support for this model via the EIB and the EU funds.
但圍繞政府和社會資本合作方式等私人融資工具的好處的說法已不復存在。隨著時間的推移，政府和社會資本合作方式的負面影響越來越明顯，因此受到越來越多公眾的強烈反對，一些歐洲國家已經放棄了這種模式。2018年3月，歐洲審計院發布了一份特別報告，揭露政府和社會資本合作方式的失敗，並抨擊歐盟通過歐洲投資銀行和歐盟基金支援這種模式。
In the face of the growing skepticism and evidence against PPPs, it would have been logical for the EIB and the Commission to adopt a cautious approach in the use of such mechanisms under the Investment Plan for Europe. But the figures show that the EFSI is actually promoting the PPP model around Europe: Until the end of 2018, the EFSI had approved and/or signed at least 28 PPP projects through guarantees of at least EUR 3.995 billion[1]. It is striking that for 14 (exactly half) of these PPP projects, the EIB and European Commission do not disclose the amount of financial support provided. This represents a genuine lack of transparency, considering this is public money (EIB loans) guaranteed by taxpayers money (the EU budget). Looking at a breakdown of these investments by sector, the largest number are projects in the transport sector (17 projects), followed by health (4), education (2), digital (2), energy (1), social housing (1) and flood defence infrastructure (1). In terms of geographical coverage, the biggest beneficiaries are Germany (6), the Netherlands (5), Ireland (3), France (2), Poland (2) and Austria (2).
面對越來越多的對政府和社會資本合作方式的質疑，歐洲投資銀行和委員會應在容克投資計劃下對此類機制的使用採取謹慎態度。但數據顯示，歐洲戰略投資基金實際上是在歐洲推動政府和社會資本合作方式模式：截至2018年底，歐洲戰略投資基金通過和/或簽署了擔保至少為39.95億歐元的28個政府和社會資本合作方式項目[1]。令人驚訝的是，對於其中14個（正好一半）的政府和社會資本合作方式項目，EIB和歐盟委員會沒有披露提供的資金支援金額。考慮到這是由納稅人的錢（歐盟預算）擔保的公共資金（歐洲投資銀行貸款），這代表了真正缺乏透明度。從這些投資的部門細分來看，數量最多的是交通部門的項目（17個項目），其次是健康（4）、教育（2）、數字（2）、能源（1）、社會住房（1）)和防洪基礎設施(1)。就地域覆蓋而言，最大的受益者是德國（6）、荷蘭（5）、愛爾蘭（3）、法國（2）、波蘭（2）和奧地利（2）。
Some of the most problematic trends and controversial projects in the field are exposed below:
該領域一些問題最大的政府和社會資本合作項目如下：
Germany: Autobahn A10 A24 PPP Neuruppin – Pankow;
德國：高速公路A10 A24 PPP 諾伊魯平 – 潘科項目;The Netherlands: A9 Amsterdam PPP; A6 Almere Motorway PPP;
荷蘭：A9 阿姆斯特丹 PPP項目；A6阿爾梅勒高速公路 PPP項目;Greece: Regional Airports PPP Project;
希臘：區域機場PPP項目;Ireland: Primary Care Centers PPP;
愛爾蘭：初級保健中心PPP項目;Austria: KRANKENHAUS WIEN NORD(2010);
奧地利：北維也納醫院 PPP項目(2010) ;United Kingdom: MIDLAND METROPOLITAN HOSPITAL PPP(2015);
英國：美聯都會醫院PPP項目（2015）;Sweden: Nya Karolinska Solna Hospital PPP Project (2010);
瑞典：新卡羅林斯卡索爾納醫院PPP項目(2010);
(See Section 2 for part of projects' details)
(部分案例詳情見第二章)
Low Transparency
項目的低透明度
The environmental and social assessments carried out by the EIB, as well as its monitoring of projects and their implementation, all lack transparency. The results of the Bank’s due diligence are made public only after the EIB Board of Directors approves a project, which is not consistent with the practices of its peer institutions. The summary of the EIB’s environmental and social appraisal is not made public before projects are approved by the Board. Also, the Environmental and Social Impact Rating, which indicates the anticipated level of environmental and social risk for a given project, is not made public at any stage, although it may be available on request. This prevents stakeholders from meaningfully engaging with the EIB before financing decisions are taken and from bringing their possible concerns to the attention of the Bank before due diligence is finalized. Good practice among other multilateral development institutions – timely disclosure and addressing incoming inquiries and comments during project appraisal – is considered by the EIB as unnecessary interference with its top-down decision making process.
歐洲投資銀行進行的環境和社會評估以及對項目及其實施的監督都缺乏透明度。銀行盡職調查的結果只有在歐洲投資銀行董事會批准項目後才會公開，這與同業機構的做法不一致。在項目獲得董事會批准之前，歐洲投資銀行的環境和社會評估摘要不會公開。此外，儘管可以應要求提供，但環境和社會影響評級表明特定項目的環境和社會風險的預期水準在任何階段都不會公開。這不僅阻止了利益相關者在做出投資決定之前與聯係歐洲投資銀行，也阻止了他們在盡職調查完成之前向銀行提出他們的顧慮。其他多邊發展機構的良好做法——在項目評估期間及時披露和處理收到的詢問和評論——被歐洲投資銀行認為是對其自上而下的決策過程的不必要幹擾。
Un-transparent Investments into Equity Funds
股票基金投資不透明
The EIB argues that investment funds it supports are subject to the surveillance of the relevant national financial regulator where the fund is established. But as revelations of the Luxembourg Times – based on an internal audit at the EIB and additional work from the consultancy firm PWC – demonstrate, this is not always sufficient to avoid prohibited conduct and ensure sound monitoring of intermediated projects. Indeed, the audit reveals serious failings of the Bank on the anti money laundering front, especially as far as support to investment funds is concerned.
歐洲投資銀行辯稱，其支持的投資基金受到設立該基金的相關國家金融監管機構的監督。但根據《盧森堡時報》對歐洲投資銀行的內部審計和諮詢公司 PWC 的額外工作，揭示了歐洲投資銀行的所作所爲並不足以避免違禁行爲，也不能對內部項目起到有效的監控。事實上，審計揭示了銀行在反洗錢方面的嚴重失誤，尤其是在對投資基金的支持方面。
This confirms the fact that financial operations going through commercial banks bear serious risks for the EIB. Back in January 2018, an evaluation from the EIB focusing on its operations via financial intermediaries in the ACP regions under its Investment Facility raised serious concerns about the lack of control, monitoring and reporting on intermediated operations.
這印證了一個事實，即通過商業銀行進行的金融操作給歐洲投資銀行帶來了嚴重的風險。早在2018年1月，歐洲投資銀行的一項評估，側重於其投資機制下通過非加太地區的金融仲介機構開展的業務，引起了人們對中間業務缺乏控制、監測和報告的嚴重擔憂。
These findings contradict one of the arguments often used by the Bank, that the EIB’s participation in these funds leads to a significant improvement of their practices and E&S standards. This also casts serious doubt on how much control the EIB really has over the intermediary institution, and if any solid mechanisms are in place to avoid its funds being misused. And a similar paradox has emerged in the case of the Vinca waste incinerator project in Belgrade.
這些發現與歐洲投資銀行經常使用的其中一個論點相矛盾，即歐洲投資銀行參與這些基金來顯著改善其實踐和環境與社會標準。這也讓人嚴重懷疑歐洲投資銀行對仲介機構的真正控制權，以及是否有任何可靠的機制來避免其資金被濫用。而類似的悖論也出現在貝爾格萊德的Vinca垃圾焚燒爐項目中。EIB Transparency in Practice
實踐中的歐洲投資銀行透明度
Despite the creation of a public register of documents and the publication of the minutes of the EIB Board of Directors meetings, the transparency of EIB operations – especially its active dissemination of information – remains limited. This lack of progress on the transparency front is clearly visible in the Aid Transparency Index, currently the only independent measure of aid transparency for the world’s major development agencies, produced by Publish What You Fund. In 2020, the EIB scored “fair” (58/100 points)[3] and stood far below some of its peer institutions, such as the EBRD, the World Bank or the Asian Development Bank (ADB).
儘管建立了公開的文件登記冊並公佈了歐洲投資銀行董事會會議記錄，但歐洲投資銀行運作的透明度——尤其是其積極傳播資訊——仍然有限。這種在透明度方面缺乏進展的情況，在透明度指數中清晰可見，該指數目前是世界主要發展機構援助透明度的唯一獨立衡量標準，由PublishWhatYouFund創建。2020年，歐洲投資銀行的得分為“一般”（58/100分）[3]，遠低於歐洲復興開發銀行、世界銀行或亞洲開發銀行等一些同行機構。
The Index pointed to several areas of poor transparency for the EIB, in particular the lack of data and documents that are essential to assess whether a project has achieved its development aims. This includes reviews and evaluations, objectives and results. Indeed, the EIB projects’ results are not published, and pre-project impact appraisals as well as reviews and evaluations are only available sometimes. It is therefore not surprising that the European Parliament regularly calls on the EIB to raise the bar on transparency. For example, in July 2020, in its annual report on the financial activities of the EIB, the European Parliament called for transparent decision-making, specifically concerning the meetings of the Management Committee and their outcomes, as well as enhanced transparency and access to information, especially regarding the selection, monitoring and evaluation of its activities and programmes. It urged the Bank to ensure the highest level of integrity of its financial intermediaries, and to guarantee that their loans are subject to the same transparency requirements as other types of loans.
該指數指出了歐洲投資銀行透明度較差的幾個領域，特別是缺乏評估項目是否已實現其發展目標所必需的數據和文件。這包括審查和評估、目標和結果。事實上，歐洲投資銀行項目的結果並未公佈，項目前的影響評估以及審查和評估僅在某些時候提供。因此，歐洲議會經常呼籲歐洲投資銀行提高透明度也就不足為奇了。例如，在2020年7月，歐洲議會在其關於歐洲投資銀行財務活動的年度報告中呼籲透明決策，特別是關於管理委員會會議及其結果的決策，以及提高透明度和資訊獲取，特別是關於其活動和計劃的選擇、監測和評估。它敦促世界銀行確保其金融仲介機構的最高誠信度，並保證它們的貸款與其他類型的貸款一樣遵守相同的透明度要求。SHORTCOMINGS IN THE PUBLICATION OF PROJECT RELATED DOCUMENTS:
項目相關文件發布的不足：
The EIB still fails to comply with transparency requirements from its own Transparency Policy and the EU legislation on access to information. It also lags behind the transparency and disclosure practices of other multilateral financial institutions. For instance, despite having created a public register of documents and making more documents available through this register, the EIB still fails to disclose all relevant project related documents or fails to disclose them in a timely manner.
歐洲投資銀行仍然未能遵守其自身的透明度政策，和歐盟關於資訊獲取立法的透明度要求。它還落後於其他多邊金融機構的透明度和披露做法。例如，儘管建立了檔公開登記冊並通過該登記冊提供了更多檔，但歐洲投資銀行仍然未能披露所有與項目相關的檔或未能及時披露。ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL DATA SHEETS:
環境和社會數據表:
The EIB’s environmental and social appraisal of individual projects is summarized in the Environmental and Social Data Sheets. These documents are released only after the Board of Directors has already taken its decision on a specific finance proposal. This is problematic especially for projects with anticipated environmental and social impacts for which ESIAs have not yet been conducted. In comparison, the IFC publishes its Environmental and Social Review Summary (findings and recommendations related to environmental and social considerations) either 60 or 30 days before the relevant Board meeting, depending on the type of project at stake. There are also other key documents related to the environmental, social and development assessments of its operations that the EIB does not publish:
歐洲投資銀行對單個項目的環境和社會評估在環境和社會數據表中進行了總結。這些文件僅在董事會就特定財務提案做出決定後才會發布。這對於具有預期環境和社會影響但尚未進行社會影響評估的項目來說尤其成問題。相比之下，國際金融公司會在相關董事會會議前60天或30天發布其環境和社會審查摘要（與環境和社會考慮相關的調查結果和建議），具體取決於所涉項目的類型。還有其他與歐洲投資銀行未公佈的業務環境、社會和發展評估相關的關鍵文件：Result Measurement Sheets (ReM sheets);
結果測量表（ReM 表）；Overall Environmental and Social Assessment Form (which includes information on the EIB’s risk rating of the project and calculations of the greenhouse gas footprint assessment, including a description of footprint calculations assumptions);
總體環境和社會評估表（包括EIB對項目的風險評級和溫室氣體足跡評估計算的資訊，包括對足跡計算假設的描述）；Project monitoring reports;
項目監測報告；The Economic Rate of Return and Financial Rate of Return calculations, which calculate economic and financial rates related to the project, including environmentally-related considerations such as the cost of environmental externalities;
經濟回報率和財務回報率計算，計算與項目相關的經濟和財務回報率，包括與環境相關的考慮因素，例如環境外部性的成本；
PROJECT MONITORING INFORMATION
項目監控信息
Although the Bank requires project promoters to monitor the impacts of a project during its implementation until its completion, the EIB does not make this information publicly available. In addition, the Bank’s own monitoring reports or those commissioned from technical advisors are not disclosed unless an external stakeholder requests them from the Bank. Yet the existence of these documents is not mentioned in the public register, where they should at least be listed.
儘管銀行要求項目發起人對項目進行全程檢測，但歐洲投資銀行並未公開這些資訊。此外，除非外部利益相關者向銀行提出要求，否則銀行自己的監測報告或委託技術顧問的監測報告不予披露。然而，這些文件的存在並沒有在公共登記冊中提及，至少應該在那裡列出。
Financial Intermediates - A Black Box of EIB Financing and Operation
金融仲介——歐洲投資銀行融資和運營的黑匣子
A considerable part of the EIB’s financing in the EU takes place via financial intermediaries: commercial banks, national promotional banks, micro-finance institutions and investment and equity funds.
歐洲投資銀行在歐盟內相當一部分的融資是通過金融仲介機構進行的：商業銀行、國家促銷銀行、小額信貸機構以及投資和股權基金。
As a matter of fact, the EIB provides next to no information on where the money ends up. Information about the ultimate beneficiaries is not made public due to commercial confidentiality clauses included in contracts with the financial intermediaries. This makes it impossible to assess the economic and social impact of the loans and prevents the development of a targeted approach to certain sectors or types of SMEs.
事實上，歐洲投資銀行幾乎沒有提供有關資金最終去向的資訊。由於與金融仲介機構簽訂的合同中包含商業機密條款，有關最終受益人的信息不會公開。這使得無法評估貸款的經濟和社會影響，並阻礙針對某些部門或類型的中小企業製定有針對性的方法。
Furthermore, the EIB does not provide information on how financial intermediaries have used its funds and whether they have proven capacity and capability to manage the environmental and social risks and impacts arising from their operations according to the EU standards. Information on final projects financed through the intermediaries is unknown, even on an aggregated level. Not applying the same standards to these loans exempts a large part of the EIB’s lending activity from transparency and openness principles, fails to ensure any accountability as to the way loans are spent and projects are carried out, and provides no details about their impact on the environment.
此外，歐洲投資銀行沒有提供有關金融仲介機構如何使用其資金的資訊，以及他們是否已證明有能力根據歐盟標準管理其運營所產生的環境和社會風險和影響。通過仲介機構資助的最終項目的資訊是未知的，即使是在匯總層面也是如此。對這些貸款不採用相同的標準，會使 歐洲投資銀行的大部分貸款活動免於透明度和開放性原則，無法確保對貸款的使用方式和項目的實施進行任何問責，也沒有提供有關其對環境。
This approach also prevents people impacted by projects financed through financial intermediaries from executing their right to complain to the EIB Complaints Mechanism and the European Ombudsman. Bankwatch’s research showed that the EIB provided over € 22 million112 for the construction of at least 19 small and mini hydropower plants through financial intermediaries in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia between 2010 and 2014[2]. The Western Balkans are under threat of massive and poorly planned hydropower development, with hardly a river or stream left untouched by the plans. However, in most cases the public has no idea about these plans and the Bank’s involvement, which creates a major hole in the Bank’s accountability. Therefore, the EIB should collect and disseminate environmental information related to projects financed by financial intermediaries to ensure the same transparency standards as for direct operations.
這種做法還會阻止受到項目負面影響的人們對歐洲投資銀行進行投訴。Bankwatch的研究表明，2010 年至 2014 年間，歐洲投資銀行通過金融仲介在波斯尼亞和黑塞哥維那、克羅地亞、馬其頓和塞爾維亞提供了超過 2200 萬歐元的資金，用於建設至少19座小型和微型水電站[2]。此舉導致西巴爾乾地區正面臨大規模和水電開發計劃不周，幾乎所以河流或小溪都受到了計劃的影響。然而，在大多數情況下，公眾對這些計劃和銀行的參與一無所知，這在銀行的問責制中造成了重大漏洞。因此，歐洲投資銀行應收集和傳播與金融仲介機構資助的項目相關的環境資訊，以確保與直接運營相同的透明度標準。
Superficial Due Diligence and Monitoring of Projects
膚淺的盡職調查與項目監控
Although the existing Handbook should trigger thorough environmental and social due diligence, there is a pool of evidence suggesting that the Bank’s due diligence and monitoring of the projects’ compliance with the applicable standards remain superficial.
儘管現有的“手冊”倡導進行徹底的環境和社會盡職調查，但有大量證據表明，銀行對項目遵守適用標準的盡職調查和監督仍然是十分膚淺的。
On the corruption front, the outsourcing of due diligence is also a particularly concerning issue. The case - CORRIDOR VC IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA - is dedicated to the Bank’s support for the private equity fund Emerging Capital Partners (ECP). It is also worth noting the EIB’s support to the Abraaj Group (through a €20 million equity investment in the fund)[1], given the major corruption scandal that hit this prominent fund in 2019. Abraaj was active in the Middle East and received financing from numerous development banks. In its reply to our draft report, the Bank noted that EIB had exposure to seven funds managed by entities controlled by Abraaj Holding Limited when the first allegations of potential misuse of money were made at the beginning of 2018. In July 2018 the EIB opened an investigation, however no evidence was obtained that the misuse of money has impacted any funds in which EIB has invested. EIB is monitoring the outcome of the judicial proceedings in the USA and UK in relation to Abraaj Group executives. But even if the EIB’s investment may not be directly impacted, this story sheds light on the type of equity funds that can become EIB clients.
在腐敗方面，盡職調查的外包也是一個特別令人擔憂的問題。案例——波士尼亞赫塞哥維納E73公路——專門介紹了銀行對私募股權基金 Emerging Capital Partners (ECP) 的支援。還值得注意的是歐洲投資銀行對 Abraaj Group 的支持（通過對該基金的 2000 萬歐元股權投資）[1]，因為該基金在 2019 年遭遇了重大腐敗醜聞。該銀行指出，在 2018 年初首次提出可能濫用資金的指控時，歐洲投資銀行對由 Abraaj 股份有限公司控制實體管理的七支基金有風險敞口。2018 年 7 月，歐洲投資銀行開放調查，但是沒有證據表明濫用資金影響了歐洲投資銀行投資的任何基金。歐洲投資銀行正在監控美國和英國與 Abraaj 集團高管有關的司法程式的結果。但即使歐洲投資銀行的投資可能不會受到直接影響，這個故事也揭示了可以成為歐洲投資銀行客戶的股票基金類型。
References
參考
歐洲投資計劃 - 試點階段的批判性分析“容克計劃”(2019). Retrieved 23 June 2021, from https://bankwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/EFSI-final.pdf
歐洲投資銀行能否成為“歐盟開發銀行”？(2020). Retrieved 23 June 2021, from https://bankwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/2020-Can-the-EIB-become-the-EU-Development-Bank_Online.pdf
歐洲投資銀行(EIB) - 2020 年援助透明度指數 - Publish What You Fund. (2020). Retrieved 23 June 2021, from https://www.publishwhatyoufund.org/the-index/2020/eib/
5
Statistic of Problematic Signed Projects
問題項目之統計
Problematic Signed Projects Statistic
已簽署之問題項目統計
The Junker Investment Plan has signed a total of 656 projects, of which 28 have serious problems such as corruption, fraud, and financial fraud, accounting for 28.4%. Among all the problematic projects, projects that are related to corruption, bribery, abuse of power, and that adopt PPP mode, which is unmatched to project operations, account for 22% and 19% respectively. Among them, there are many well-known international companies. For example, Ericsson admitted that it violated the FCPA, engaged in bribery and falsified books and records for a long time; Renfe Operadora was fined 15.1 million euros for abuse of power; BBVA was accused of corruption Wait.
容克投資計劃已立項項目共656項，其中有28個項目存在貪污、欺詐、財務造假等嚴重問題，占比為28.4%。在所有存在嚴重問題的項目中，腐敗,賄賂,濫用職權的項目，及采用和項目運營方式不符的政府與社會資本合作（PPP）模式的項目占比最高，分別爲22%與19%。其中，不乏知名國際公司的存在，例如愛立信公司承認其違反 FCPA，長期從事賄賂、偽造賬簿和記錄；西班牙鐵路公司因濫用濫用職權而被罰款 1510 萬歐元；西班牙外換銀行被指控犯有腐敗罪等。